Taliban will try to 'retake' Helmand province, says report

The Taliban will try to 'retake' the Afghan province of Helmand once foreign forces withdraw at the end of 2014, according to a study by academics from the Department of War Studies at King's College London, published today in the Chatham House journal International Affairs. The report also criticises British commanders for triggering 'a violent intensification of the insurgency' by sending thousands of soldiers to the province in 2006.

Offering unique insight into the insurgency's perspective through more than 100 interviews with Taliban commanders, the report says the Taliban has proven 'remarkably resilient' to pressure from British and US forces.

The study examines the evolution of the Taliban insurgency in Helmand since 2006, reporting on the centralization of its organisational structure, more militarized shadow government, and greater professionalism of field units.

Professor Theo Farrell and Dr Antonio Giustozzi, War Studies, who co-authored the report, warn: 'What we find is an insurgency that is driven both by a strong unifying strategic narrative and purpose – jihad against foreign invaders – and by local conflict dynamics: rivalry between kinship groups and competition over land, water and drugs.' They add: 'The manner of the Taliban return to Helmand shows clear intent to retake the province.'

On recent reports of growing support among field commanders for ceasefire talks, Professor Farrell says the influence of Taliban military commissions in the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar means they are 'unlikely to give ground easily in negotiations.'

Addressing the decision to send British forces to Helmand in 2006, the report adds: 'By arriving with insufficient force, aligning themselves with local corrupt power-holders, relying on firepower to keep insurgents at bay and targeting the poppy crop, the British made matters worse. Far from securing Helmand, British forces alienated the population, mobilised local armed resistance and drew in foreign fighters seeking jihad.'

The authors describe British troops as 'blindly ignorant of the local politics underpinning [the insurgency]', resulting in a climate that made it 'far easier' for the Taliban to recruit local fighters.

View the report, "The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-2012."

Provided by King's College London